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COMMENTS
THE CITADEL FALLS?-LIABILITY FOR
ACCOUNTANTS IN NEGLIGENCE TO
THIRD PARTIES ABSENT PRIVITY:
CREDIT ALLIANCE CORP. V. ARTHUR
ANDERSEN & CO.
Accountants generally have been insulated from liability to
third parties for negligent misrepresentation absent proof of contractual privity between the injured party and the accountant.1 Al-

'

See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-89, 174 N.E. 441, 444-48 (1931).
The requirement of privity was first established in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (1842). In Winterbottom, a passenger injured in the collapse of a coach was denied
recovery from the party who negligently failed to maintain the coach because no duty existed in the absence of contractual privity between the two. Id. at 403. The stated purpose
of privity was to shield fledgling industries from potentially unlimited tort liability to the
general public. See id. at 405; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §
93, at 668 (5th ed. 1984). Historically, absent a contractual relationship, the negligent party
did not owe a duty of care to the injured party and, thus, the injured party could not recover in negligence for either personal or pecuniary injury. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra,
§ 93, at 668. While lack of privity has long been abandoned as a bar to recovery for personal
injuries, vestiges of the doctrine remain where relief for only economic harm is sought. See
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1976); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, § 97, at 690, §
107, at 747. One such vestige is accountants' liability to non-privy third parties. W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, supra, § 107, at 746-47; see also Ultramares,255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444
(permitting third parties to recover in negligence "may expose accountants to liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class"); Candler v.
Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164, 169 (accountants owe no duty of care absent
contractual privity). The continued application of the privity requirement to accountant
negligence cases may be attributed to the unique position of accountants in the business
community as producers of financial information that is distributed to an enormous and
varied group of potential users. See Comment, Auditor's Third PartyLiability: An Ill-Conskdered Extension of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REv. 675, 680-81 & n.30 (1971) (accounting firms
exposed to widespread liability due to number of people likely to rely on auditor's opinion
and amount of revenue involved) (quoting Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to
Third Parties for Negligence, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 588, 597 (1967)).
Until the late 1960's, parties lacking privity were reluctant to bring negligence actions
against auditors presumably because there was little authority to support their claims. See
Besser, Privity-An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties,7
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though plaintiffs have successfully predicated recovery from accountants on fraud, liability for auditors' negligence remains the
final bastion in "the assault upon the citadel of privity. . . ."I DeL. REV. 507, 507 n.2, 517-18 & n.39 (1976) (citing Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1966, at
1, col. 6, at 13, col. 2) (figures showing small number of suits against accountants). Thus, not
only did few opportunities arise for the judiciary to question the reasoning behind the privity requirement, but also, because of the great deference given to Chief Judge Cardozo, the
author of the opinion in Ultramares,few courts actually questioned the doctrine. See Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 233, 236 & n.9 (1983).
2 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207 (1976) (federal securities law
subjects accountants to liability for fraud based on "willing, knowing, or purposeful conduct"); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 131
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (accountants owe common-law duty to third parties to act without fraud in
the preparation of financial statements), aff'd in partand rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1976); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Atherton, 47 N.M. 443, 449, 144 P.2d 157, 161 (1943) (accountants who knew or should have known their employer intended to display financial
statements to third persons owe those third persons duty not to act fraudulently); see also
Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 189-93, 174 N.E. at 448-50 (discussion of accountants' liability for
fraud). See generally Symposium on Accounting and the FederalSecurities Laws, 28 VAND.
L. REV. 1 (1975) (discussing potential aspects of accountants' liability).
Fraudulent representations by accountants generally are actionable without the establishment of privity. E.g., Ultramares,255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. Chief Judge Cardozo
wrote that to escape liability for fraud, accountants must have a "sincere or genuine belief
when they certif[y] to an opinion that the balance sheet faithfully reflect[s] the condition of
SETON HALL

the business .

. . ."

Id. at 193, 174 N.E. at 450. Chief Judge Cardozo stated that although

even gross negligence alone was not enough to create liability, a jury may be able to infer
fraud from negligent conduct. Id. at 190-91, 174 N.E. at 449; see also State St. Trust Co. v.
Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 112, 15 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1938) ("[a] refusal to see the obvious, a failure
to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an inference
of fraud").
Through the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)) (the Act), Congress attempted to promulgate
standards of conduct for participants in the securities markets to prevent repetition of the
chaos of the early 1930's. See Vernava,Responsibility of the Accountant Under the Federal
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 6 J. CoR'. L. 317, 318 (1981). Investors relying on intentionally or knowingly misleading statements to their detriment may employ § 10(b) of the
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), in conjunction with Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984),
to recover for such statements from accountants. Vernava, supra, at 321-23. However, the
Supreme Court has held that under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, accountants must have acted
with scienter; thus, mere negligence is not enough. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (§
10(b) requires "intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors").
3 Ultramares,255 N.Y. at 180, 174 N.E. at 444; see Recent Decision, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 281, 295 (1983) (accountants' liability for negligence to third parties described as an
anachronism). In products liability cases, the privity requirement has been dispensed with
when the plaintiff asserts a claim for personal injury, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 372, 161 A.2d 69, 77 (1960); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 463, 12 P.2d 409,
412 (1932), and, in many jurisdictions, privity no longer is a prerequisite to recovery for
pecuniary loss, see Peterson v. North Am. Plant Breeders, 218 Neb. 258, 267, 354 N.W.2d
625, 631 (1984); Hiles Co. v. Johnston Pump Co., 93 Nev. 73, 78-79, 560 P.2d 154, 157

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:348

spite repeated criticism by commentators disturbed by judicial refusal to apply the general negligence formula to accountant liability cases,4 the privity requirement remains entrenched in many
(1977); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 13, 181 N.E.2d 399,
402-03, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 368 (1962).
Similarly, in actions seeking to recover from professionals other than accountants, the
privity requirement has begun to vanish. See Sanbar & Pataki, ProfessionalLiability: Malpractice of Attorneys, Accountants, Architects, and Engineers, 3 OKLA. CITY L. REv. 689,
689-90 (1979). Originally, attorneys were held responsible only to parties in privity. Savings
Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879); see Sanbar & Pataki, supra, at 699-700. However,
the recent trend is to permit plaintiffs lacking a contractual relationship with the attorney
to recover for their injuries. See Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 794-95, 558
P.2d 988, 989-91 (1976); Garcia v. Borelli, 129 Cal. App. 3d 24, 32, 180 Cal. Rptr. 768, 772
(1982); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (D.C. 1983). But see Calamari v.
Grace, 98 App. Div. 2d 74, 77-79, 469 N.Y.S.2d 942, 944-45 (2d Dep't 1983) (New York
requires privity of contract as element of cause of action for attorney malpractice). The
liability of architects and engineers to third parties not in privity is more readily justifiable,
because the negligence of these professionals often results in personal injury as well as pecuniary loss. See, e.g., Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 83-84, 199 N.E.2d 769,
778-81 (1964) (privity of contract not prerequisite to recovery when negligent engineering
work resulted in collapse of construction hoist that killed seven people); see also Sanbar &
Pataki, supra, at 710-11. In fact, some cases involving only economic harm have not required any showing of privity between the plaintiff and the defendant architect or engineer.
Sanbar & Pataki, supra, at 710-11; see Robert & Co. v. Rhodes-Haverty Partnership, 250
Ga. 680, 681-82, 300 S.E.2d 503, 504 (1983); see also Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 59-62,
250 N.E.2d 656, 660-63 (1969) (surveyor liable to third parties for faulty survey).
" See Kelly, An Overview of Accountants' Liability, 15 FORUM 579, 582 (1980). Many
commentators view privity as a crude and artificial restraint that arbitrarily forecloses foreseeable plaintiffs. See id.; Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for
Negligence, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 588, 597 (1967); Recent Decision, supra note 3, at 295. But
see Comment, supra note 1, at 707 (abrogation of privity doctrine will damage users and
suppliers of capital, auditors, and channels of resource distribution).
Chief Justice Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares was heavily criticized by his contemporaries, see, e.g., Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 COLuz L. REv. 20, 49
(1939), and this criticism continues among those modern commentators who believe that
Chief Judge Cardozo's concern that accountants would be incapable of compensating those
injured by negligently prepared financial statements is no longer an appropriate consideration, see, e.g., Besser, supra note 1, at 535-37; see also Note, Accountants' Liability for
Negligence-A ContemporaryApproach for a Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L. Rav. 401,
401, 414-15 (1979) (accounting profession today is most capable of adequately distributing
risk of making negligent misstatement to non-privy third party through professional malpractice insurance) [hereinafter cited as ContemporaryApproach]. There is little economic
justification for allowing auditors to escape traditional negligence liability since the presentday accounting industry is fiscally sound. See 43 Facts on File 366, col. 2, May 20, 1983; see
also Wiener, supra note 1, at 236 n.10 (noting economic maturation of accounting industry).
The changing function of accountants in modern business presents another compelling
argument for the imposition of liability on accountants without privity. See infra note 51.
Today, commercial and private investors use financial statements to evaluate business opportunities, see ContemporaryApproach, supra, at 414, and federal securities laws require
filings and distribution of such statements to stockholders, see Securities Act of 1933, § 7,
schedule A & B, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77aa (1982).
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jurisdictions.' Recently, however, in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,' the Appellate Division, First Department,
while holding that a party without privity can recover from auditors provided he is within a limited class of foreseen users,' suggested, in dictum, that auditors' liability be extended to all foreseeable users of negligently prepared financial statements.8
In Credit Alliance, the plaintiffs, Credit Alliance Corp. (Credit
Alliance) and Leasing Services Corp. (Leasing Services), had extended limited financing to L.B. Smith, Inc. (Smith) through the
purchase of chattel paper.9 Subsequently, in alleged reliance upon
Smith's financial statements prepared by the defendant, Arthur
Andersen & Company (Arthur Andersen), Credit Alliance and
Leasing Services greatly increased the amouht of credit extended
to Smith. 10 The financial statements, certified by Arthur Andersen
A negligence cause of action traditionally consists of four elements: (1) the existence of
a duty between the plaintiff and the defendant; (2) a failure to fulfill that duty adequately;
(3) an injury to one who is owed the duty; and (4) a causal relationship between the failure
of the duty and the resulting injury. W. PROSSER & W. KEETrON, supra note 1, § 30, at 143;
see Frazier v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 645, 646-47 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Barr v. County of
Albany, 69 App. Div. 2d 914, 915, 415 N.Y.S.2d 471, 473 (3d Dep't 1979), modified, 50
N.Y.2d 247, 406 N.E.2d 481, 428 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1980). This four-pronged negligence test has
seldom been fully applied in accountant's negligence cases because the lack of privity traditionally has prevented a non-privy plaintiff from establishing that a duty was owed to him
by the defendant auditors. See, e.g., Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291, 293-96
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (negligence action against defendant properly dismissed without consideration by jury when no privity between defendant and plaintiff is pleaded), cert. dismissed, 216 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1968); MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 370, 199 S.E.2d
564, 566 (1973) (summary judgment in favor of defendant auditors proper when no contractual duty exists between plaintiff and defendant). There are few cases in which all elements
of a negligence cause of action have been applied to accountants, because even when privity
does not bar recovery, settlements are often arranged. See Wiener, supra note 1, at 233 n.1.
' See, e.g., Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1971);
Investors Tax Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 370
So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980); Dworman
v. Lee, 83 App. Div. 2d 507, 507, 441 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (1st Dep't 1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 816,
438 N.E.2d 103, 452 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982).
6 101 App. Div. 2d 231, 476 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1st Dep't 1984).
7 Id. at 235-36, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
1 Id. at 238, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 543-44.
0 Id. at 232, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 540. Credit Alliance and Leasing Services are associated
organizations that provide financing for capital equipment through leasing programs and
installment sales. Id. Smith, a seller and lessor of construction equipment, received financing through the assignment of its customers' obligations to the plaintiffs, while Smith remained contingently liable to the plaintiffs in the event of customer default. Id.
10 Id. at 232-34, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41. Credit Alliance and Leasing Services requested
audited statements from Smith before complying with Smith's request to increase their financial commitment. Id. at 233, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41. In the course of the financial relationship between Smith and the plaintiffs, Arthur Andersen prepared two sets of financial
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as an accurate reflection of Smith's financial position,1 1 portrayed
Smith as a financially sound corporation.1 2 Within two years of acquiring the increased financing from Credit Alliance and Leasing
Services, however, Smith defaulted on its obligations to the plaintiffs and filed for bankruptcy. 3 Credit Alliance and Leasing Services brought suit against Arthur Andersen for losses resulting
from reliance upon Arthur Andersen's alleged negligently prepared
financial statements.14 The Supreme Court, Special Term,
New York County, dismissed the plaintiffs' negligence claim as
time-barred,' 5 but subsequently reinstated the claim on rehearstatements on behalf of Smith. Id. at 234, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 541. The first set of financial
statements reflected Smith's financial position as of December 31, 1977 (1977 statements).
See id. at 233, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 541. Allegedly relying on the 1977 statements, the plaintiffs
significantly increased their financing to Smith. Id.
In 1979, the plaintiffs asked Smith for updated financial statements as a prerequisite to
the continuation of the financing arrangement. Id. Smith provided the plaintiffs with financial statements prepared by Arthur Andersen that reflected Smith's position as of February
28, 1979 (1979 statements). Id. In alleged reliance upon the 1979 statements, Credit Alliance
and Leasing Services continued their financial relationship with Smith. Id.
11 Id. at 234, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 541. Arthur Andersen issued an auditor's report with both
the 1977 statements and the 1979 statements. Record on Appeal at 38, 50, Credit Alliance
Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 101 App. Div. 2d 231, 476 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1st Dep't 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Record on Appeal]. Both reports contained the unqualified opinion of
Arthur Andersen that Smith's financial status was accurately reflected by the statements.
Record on Appeal, supra, at 38, 50. The type of opinion issued by an auditor depends upon
the compliance of the audit with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and upon
the conformity of the audited party's financial statements with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), as promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (auditing standards) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (accounting
principles). See D. TAYLOR & G. GLEZEN, AUDITING: INTEGRATED CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES
18-20 (2d ed. 1982). An unqualified opinion indicates full compliance with both GAAS and
GAAP. Id. at 19. The three other types of opinions-qualified, disclaimer, and adverse-are
used to indicate varying levels of non-conformity with GAAS or GAAP. Id.
12 Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 38-60.
1 Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 233, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 541. At the time Smith
filed its bankruptcy petition, it was indebted to Credit Alliance for more than $7.9 million,
and to Leasing Services for nearly $1 million. Id. at 233-34, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
24 Id. at 234, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
1 See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 122 Misc. 2d 1045, 1046, 471
N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (referring to prior unreported decision),
ajf'd, 101 App. Div. 2d 231, 476 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1st Dep't 1984). Arthur Andersen contended
that the complaint did not state a cause of action for negligence, and asserted that any
negligence action was barred by the statute of limitations. Credit Alliance, 122 Misc. 2d at
1046, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 939. Concluding that the negligence claim was time-barred, the trial
court agreed with Arthur Andersen's contention that a claim for alleged professional negligence accrues upon completion of the disputed work. Id. at 1046, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 939; see
Sosnow v. Paul, 43 App. Div. 2d 978, 979, 352 N.Y.S.2d 502, 504 (2d Dep't 1974), aff'd, 36
N.Y.2d 780, 330 N.E.2d 643, 369 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1975). Notwithstanding the operation of the
statute of limitations, the trial court stated that the "plaintiffs were in the limited class of
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ing.16
The Appellate Division affirmed the reinstatement, finding
that the plaintiffs were members of a limited class of foreseen
users who might have detrimentally relied on Smith's financial
statements and, as such, were owed a duty of care by the defendants. 17 Writing for the majority, Judge Ross reiterated the longstanding rule of Ultramares Corp. v. Touchel s that accountants
are not liable for negligently prepared financial statements absent
proof of contractual privity.19 However, Judge Ross determined
financiers whose reliance on [Andersen's] financial reports was foreseeable. Plaintiffs were
thus owed a duty of care by Andersen." Credit Alliance, 122 Misc. 2d at 1046-47, 471
N.Y.S.2d at 939-40.
Additionally, Credit Alliance and Leasing Services alleged that Arthur Andersen committed fraud in the preparation of the Smith financial statements. Id. The trial court refused to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the fraud count for lack of particularity in
the pleading. Id.
6 Credit Alliance, 122 Misc. 2d at 1045, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 938. The court determined
that, since no contractual agreement existed between the plaintiffs and the defendant, the
plaintiffs' action was not one for professional malpractice, and should be governed by the 3year statute of limitations applied for garden variety negligence. See id. at 1049, 471
N.Y.S.2d at 941. The court looked to White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401
N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977), to support the proposition that the plaintiffs, members of a known
class of users of financial information, could not detrimentally rely on that information until
the financial statements actually were received. See Credit Alliance, 122 Misc. 2d at 1047,
471 N.Y.S.2d at 941. Thus, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs' cause of action
accrued upon receipt of the financial statements. Id.
17 Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 235-36, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 542. Addressing the
statute of limitations issue, the Appellate Division agreed with the determinations of the
trial court that the plaintiffs' action was grounded in ordinary negligence, and thus was not
time-barred. Id. at 236-37, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 543. The lower court's ruling on the fraud claim
was unanimously affirmed without discussion. Id. at 232, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
18255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
19 Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 235, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 542. In Ultramares, the
defendant public accounting firm was engaged by Fred Stern & Co. (Stem) to prepare and
certify financial statements. Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442. The defendant knew that Stem
required substantial outside financing and that Stern would exhibit the financial statements
to potential funding sources such as banks and stockholders. Id. While the statements and
the auditor's report certified that Stern was in good financial condition, id. at 174, 174 N.E.
at 442, Stern was actually insolvent, id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 442.
Ultramares, claiming reliance upon the balance sheets prepared by Touche in extending
financing to Stern, sued the accountants in both negligence and fraud. Id. at 175-76, 174
N.E. at 443. Chief Judge Cardozo, writing for a unanimous Court of Appeals, held that
public accountants are not liable for the negligent preparation of financial statements in the
absence of privity of contract. See id. at 179-89, 174 N.E. at 444-48. The court expressed
fear that the accounting profession could not survive if its smallest errors were actionable by
all potential creditors and investors that received and relied upon financial statements. See
id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. Chief Judge Cardozo determined that only the legislature had
authority to impose such immense liability on the accounting profession. See id. at 187, 174
N.E. at 447.
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that the facts in Credit Alliance fell within the narrow exception
to the privity requirement recognized by the New York Court of
Appeals in White v. Guarente, 0 which allowed a limited, foreseen
class of plaintiffs to recover for detrimental reliance upon negligently prepared statements by independent auditors. 21 Based upon
the presence of certain information in the financial statements,
Judge Ross determined that Arthur Andersen foresaw the plaintiffs' reliance on those statements.2 2
In dictum, the court suggested abandoning the privity requirement and holding accountants liable to all foreseeable-as distinguished from merely foreseen-plaintiffs. 23 Advocating the excision
of the privity rule from accountants' negligence cases, Judge Ross
cited the accounting profession's development of self-regulatory
guidelines that recognize a degree of responsibility to the general
public. 24 The majority also observed that the federal securities laws
impose liability on accountants to third parties even in the absence
of privity.25 Finally, Judge Ross noted that a recent United States
20

43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977).

Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 235, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 542. In White, auditors
were retained by a limited partnership to perform auditing and tax services pursuant to a
specific provision in the partnership agreement. 43 N.Y.2d at 359, 372 N.E.2d at 317, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 476. The auditors were sued for negligently failing to disclose that several partners had withdrawn partnership funds in violation of the partnership agreement. Id. at 360,
372 N.E.2d at 317-18, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477. The majority concluded that the auditors owed a
duty to audit carefully to the plaintiffs, the limited partners, because the auditors knew or
should have known that the limited partners would use the partnership statements in preparing their personal tax returns. See id. at 361-62, 372 N.E.2d at 318-19, 401 N.Y.S.2d at
477-78. The court charged the auditors with this knowledge because the uses and users of
the statements were specified in the partnership agreement that the auditors had examined
prior to performing the audit. See id. at 361, 372 N.E.2d at 318-19, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477. The
White court distinguished Ultramaresby noting that "the services of the accountant were
not extended to a faceless or unresolved class of persons, but rather to a known group possessed of vested rights, marked by a definable limit and made up of certain components."
See id.
22 See Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 234-35, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 542 (quoting from
Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 59). The Credit Alliance court noted that a footnote to
the financial statements explained Smith's contingent liability to outside financial institutions. See 101 App. Div. 2d at 234-35, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 542. Additionally, the court noted
that Arthur Andersen did not contest the plaintiffs' assertion that few companies could provide the type of financing used by Smith. See id.; see also id. at 233, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41
(company president's affidavit stated less than eight companies capable of satisfying Smith's
financial need).
22 101 App. Div. 2d at 237-38, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 543-44 (dictum).
24 Id. at 237, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
25 Id.; see also supra note 2 (discussion of accountants' liability under federal securities
laws).
21
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Supreme Court opinion suggested that accountants be responsive
to their role as "'public watchdog[s]'" in the preparation of financial reports.2 6
Acknowledging the existence of the White exception,2 7 Judge

Milonas nevertheless dissented, stressing the continued validity of
the privity rule.2 The dissent noted that White extended accountant liability to include only the individual, existing partners of a
limited partnership that had contracted with the defendant accountants, and thus constituted only a minor retreat from the privity doctrine.2 Judge Milonas declared that the plaintiffs in Credit
Alliance could not be among the intended beneficiaries of the auditor's report, because it was specifically directed to Smith's board
members and stockholders.30 Thus, the dissent factually distinguished White and found no basis for the majority's refusal to apply the privity doctrine and dismiss the negligence action against
Arthur Andersen.3 l
The Credit Alliance court has attempted to persuade the
Court of Appeals through dictum that accountants should owe a
general duty of care to third parties despite the absence of any
"6Credit Alliance, 101

App. Div. 2d at 238, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 544 (quoting United States

v. Arthur Young & Co., 104 S. Ct. 1495, 1503 (1984)). In Arthur Young, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), while performing an audit, sought the tax accrual workpapers prepared
by the defendant public accountants for a client. 104 S. Ct. at 1498. Attempting to resolve a
conflict between the accountant-client privilege and certain visitorial provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the Court concluded that the tax code provisions relating to IRS investigations provided substantial justification for overcoming the privilege. See id. at 1502-03. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged the public responsibility of accountants.
See id. at 1503. The Supreme Court's recognition that financial statements are prepared for
distribution to a wide variety of investors and creditors, see id., was interpreted by the
Credit Alliance majority as supportive of increased liability of accountants to those relying
on their work, see Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 237, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 543 (dictum).
'7 Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 240-41, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (Milonas, J.,
dissenting).
28 Id. at 240-41, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 545-46 (Milonas, J., dissenting). The dissent cited
Dworman v. Lee, 83 App. Div. 2d 507, 507, 441 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (1st Dep't 1981), aff'd, 56
N.Y.2d 816, 438 N.E.2d 103, 452 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982), which stated that "there can be no
doubt that the rule in Ultramares remains authoritative . . . ." Credit Alliance 101 App.
Div. 2d at 241, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (Milonas, J., dissenting).
29 Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 240-41, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (Milonas, J., dissenting); see White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d at 362-63, 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at
478.
so Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 241, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (Milonas, J., dissenting); see Record on Appeal, supra note 11, at 38, 50 (auditor's reports for 1977 and 1979
statements).
" Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 241-42, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (Milonas, J.,
dissenting).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:348

contractual relationship. It is submitted, however, that the court
failed to support adequately and logically the extension of auditors' liability. This Comment will suggest a more complete consideration of the grounds supporting the disposal of the privity doctrine by using reasoning similar to that used in excising the privity
barrier from the law of products liability. Unlike products liability,
2
however, which has become synonymous with strict liability,

it

will be suggested that accountants' liability should be based upon
the traditional negligence formula.
LIABILITY TO A FORESEEN CLASS-AN APPROPRIATE FIRST STEP

The majority in Credit Alliance, while attempting to influence
the Court of Appeals to extend the scope of accountants' liability,"3
recognized the necessity of remaining within the precedent set by
Ultramares and White.34 Judge Ross equated the known, limited
class of creditors in Credit Alliance with the known class of limited partners in White,35 since neither the limited partners in
White nor the limited class of financiers in Credit Alliance enjoyed
any direct contractual relationship with the auditors.3 6 It is submitted that the Credit Alliance court's determination of the applicability of the White exception 3is7 consistent with precedent and
comports with underlying policy.

11 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 98; see also Henderson, Extending
the Boundaries of Strict ProductsLiability: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best,
128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036, 1042 & n.26 (1980) (strict liability universally applied in cases involving physical harm, but less absolute in areas of pecuniary loss); cf. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963, 965-77 (1981) (although strict liability has not definitely established itself as successor to negligence, the
possibility does exist).
3 See Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 237-38, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 543-44.
-- Id. at 235-37, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 542-43; see White, 43 N.Y.2d at 361-62, 372 N.E.2d at
318-19, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477-78; Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
3' Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 235-36, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
36 See White, 43 N.Y.2d at 359, 372 N.E.2d at 317, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 476; Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 234, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides that:
[o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information . . . [provided the loss is] suffered . . . by the person or one of a
limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the
information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it. ...

1985]

ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY

Significant policy reasons support the extension of accountants' liability to all foreseen users of financial statements3 8 Financial statements are often used to persuade existing investors, creditors, and customers of a given company to maintain and further
business relationships. 9 It is submitted that the knowledge of a
company of the need for financial information by foreseen third
parties compels the company to seek the expertise of public accountants to ensure that accurate information is provided. Thus,
auditors receive the benefit of increased billing from their clients'
known business relationships. In privity, the fees an accountant
charges are the basis of the duty of care owed by the auditor to his
clients. 40 It is suggested, therefore, that when a known class of
users is involved, the fact that the client alone remunerates its auditor should not determine the duty of care that the auditor must
heed regarding that foreseen, limited class of third parties. Instead,
the fact that a benefit was generated, although not paid, from a
known source should be determinative.
Additional policy reasons exist for holding accountants liable
for harm caused to foreseen third parties. The improved reporting
techniques that have developed since the Ultramares decision can
be used in responding to the needs of a known class of users of
financial statements to limit the incidence of negligence for which
Id. § 552 (emphasis added). The Credit Alliance court's analysis of the duty owed by Arthur
Andersen comports directly with the Restatement approach. Compare Credit Alliance, 101
App. Div. 2d at 236, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 542 with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552
(1976).
Some jurisdictions have expressly adopted § 552 of the Restatement in cases of accountants' negligence. E.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff,
Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972) (accountants liable to bank they know to
be relying on statements for guidance in evaluating loan applicant); Ingram Indus., Inc. v.
Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 684 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (auditors' liability to third parties based on
Restatement, rather than Chief Judge Cardozo's restrictive standards); Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340, 342-44 (D. Neb. 1979) (accountants potentially liable to known
option holder who makes loan on basis of negligently audited financial statements).
38 See infra notes 39-44; cf. Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 237, 476 N.Y.S.2d at
543 (development of self-regulatory guidelines in the accounting profession supports extension of liability).
" See L. BERNSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE REPORTS: A GuIDE TO FINANCIAL
STATEMENT ANALYSIS 572 (1974) (bank loan officer, insurance company, and investors-all
potential financial statement users-require analysis of financial statements before entering
into any arrangement with audited company); J. MYER, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS 5
(4th ed. 1969) (original use of financial statements was for bank's determination of credit
worthiness of potential borrower).
40 See W. RICH, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 13 (1980)
(auditor's responsibility to client based in contract).
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those users can recover. 4 ' Further, the common-law notion of placing the risk of loss on the party best able to withstand the burden
should be considered.42 Today, the accounting profession certainly
occupies a sufficiently strong financial position to bear the risk of
loss better than non-privy foreseen parties.4 3 These policy reasons
all strongly support the removal of the privity doctrine to permit
at least a foreseen, limited class of reliant third parties to recover
for injuries caused by an auditor's negligent preparation of financial statements. 44 Nevertheless, it is suggested that these same policy reasons support an imposition of liability on accountants for
injuries to all who might foreseeably rely on negligently prepared
financial statements.
" See D.

CAUSEY, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

19-22 (1979) (general

dissatisfaction with practices in profession before and during Depression led to widespread
reform and more stringent auditing and reporting practices); Flynn, Corporate Reporting
and Accounting Principles:The Viewpoint of an Independent Accountant, in CORPORATE
FINANCIAL REPORTING: CONFLICTS AND CHALLENGES 140-41 (J. Burton ed. 1969) (reporting
techniques and standards of accounting profession "hav[e] come a long way"). Indeed, the
profession has acknowledged an awareness of the needs of various non-privy users of financial statements. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 1-OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 1

24 (1978); see also Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 237, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 543; infra note
51. Since the profession has acknowledged a duty to act carefully in response to the expectations of known third-party users of financial statements, see infra note 51, it must be presumed that accountants know what such persons expect from financial statements.
42 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 4, at 24-25. The risks involved in
preparing an opinion on financial statements can be absorbed by accountants and distributed among clients in the form of increased fees. See id.; Wiener, supra note 1, at 252-53.
"' See supra note 4. It is estimated that the top eight accounting firms alone grossed in
excess of 6 billion dollars in 1982. See 43 Facts on File 366, col. 2, May 20, 1983.
" See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968). In Rusch Factors,
a corporation applied for financing from the plaintiff commercial bank. Id. at 86. The certified statements requested by the plaintiff portrayed a healthy financial picture of the corporation, while in reality the corporation was insolvent. Id. The plaintiff, relying on these
statements prepared by the defendant auditor, decided to extend the loan to the corporation. Id. at 86-87. Holding that the plaintiffs are owed a duty by the defendant, the court
determined that questions regarding the burden of financial loss should be resolved in favor
of the "innocent reliant party," id. at 91, and suggested that the imposition of liability
would compel the profession to take greater care in conducting itself toward the public, id.
In addition, the Rusch Factorscourt found that the accountant is better equipped to shoulder the risk of loss by increasing its cost to the public, id.; see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text; see also Gormley, The Foreseen,the Foreseeable,and Beyond-Accountants'
Liability to Nonclients, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 528, 540 (1984) (Rusch Factors was first
federal case seriously to question Ultramares).
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RECOVERY AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS FOR FORESEEABLE
RELIANCE-THE PROPER STANDARD

Although commentators have called for the total excision of
privity from the area of accountant negligence,4 5 many jurisdictions still retain some aspects of the doctrine.46 In H. Rosenblum,
Inc. v. Adler,41 however, the Supreme Court of New Jersey became
one of the first courts to eliminate privity completely as a barrier
to third-party recovery for the negligent misstatements of accountants.48 The Rosenblum court analogized accountants' liability to
products liability, in which the injury resulting from negligent misrepresentations accompanying the sale of goods generally is actionable without regard to privity.49 In both areas of law, the defen-

"
See Kelly, supra note 4, at 582; Wiener, supra note 1, at 260; Note, supra note 4, at
597. Even the foreseen plaintiff standard has been criticized as protecting "powerful and
sophisticated lenders, businesses and institutions whose personnel and counsel would make
certain that the auditor foresaw their reliance and knew of their transaction ....
" R.
GORMLEY, THE LAW OF AccouNTATs AD AuDrroRs-RIGHTS, DUTES AND LIABILIrTEs T
6.01[4], at 6-17 (1981). As noted, the primary reason that privity has been adhered to is the
great deference paid to precedent. See, e.g., Credit Alliance, 101 App. Div. 2d at 242, 476
N.Y.S.2d at 546 (Milonas, J., dissenting).
4' See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1202 (3d Cir. 1979) Investors Tax
Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 370 So. 2d 815,
817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980); MacNerland v.
Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 370, 199 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1973); see also Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372
F. Supp. 1058, 1063 (D.N.D. 1974) (unlimited class problem expressed in Ultramares and
recognized by Restatement still exists).
47 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
48 Id. at 353, 461 A.2d at 153; see Gormley, supra note 44, at 548-51. In Rosenblum, the
defendant Touche Ross & Co. (Touche Ross), independent auditors, issued statements and
unqualified opinions over the course of several years certifying the financial stability of Giant Stores (Giant). 93 N.J. at 329-30, 461 A.2d at 140-41. The plaintiff, H. Rosenblum, Inc.
(Rosenblum), was approached by Giant and eventually agreed to a merger between the two,
based largely upon the income stated on Giant's books at the end of the 1971 fiscal year. Id.
at 330-31, 461 A.2d at 140-41. Touche Ross failed to discover and therefore failed to disclose
on the applicable financial statements that Giant had improperly increased its asset base
while decreasing its accounts payable liability. Id. at 331, 461 A.2d at 141. Eventually, Giant
filed for bankruptcy, and Rosenblum was left with worthless shares of Giant stock. Id.
4. 93 N.J. at 339-41, 461 A.2d at 145-47. Although the Rosenblum court based its analogy on New Jersey products liability cases, it is suggested that the jurisprudence of these
decisions closely parallels that of products liability cases in New York. Tracing the development of the law of products liability, the court first considered the abrogation of the privity
requirement when a negligent representation results in personal injury. Id. at 339-40, 461
A.2d at 146; see Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 365-71, 136 A.2d 626, 629-32 (1959);
O'Donnell v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 13 N.J. 319, 331-36, 99 A.2d 577, 583-86 (1953).
The Rosenblum court went on to discuss the removal of the distinction between personal
injury and pecuniary harm in products liability cases. 93 N.J. at 340-41, 461 A.2d at 146; see
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 60, 207 A.2d 305, 310 (1965).
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dant knows or has reason to know that the statements regarding
his product or workproduct will be relied upon by parties other
than those with whom he is in contractual privity.50 Indeed, the
accounting profession itself has acknowledged its responsibility to
the general public.5 1 In addition, accountants can better provide
for the consequences of their errors through increased diligence
and appropriate insurance than can those foreseeably relying on
52
their errors.
It is submitted that the best argument for extending auditors'
liability to all foreseeable parties is that negligence actions against
accountants are no different from any other type of negligence action, and, accordingly, should require proof of the same elements.
Compensation for the purely economic harm generally alleged in
suits against accountants is clearly within the reach of negligence
law.5" It is suggested that a "foreseeable plaintiff" approach frees
0 93 N.J. at 341-42, 461 A.2d at 146. The Rosenblum court concluded that in the area
of products liability, since a claim of negligent misrepresentation is not barred for lack of
privity, there is no basis on which to bar a claim of ordinary negligence for a similar lack of
privity. Id. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147; see Santor, 44 N.J. at 60, 207 A.2d at 310; see also
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (1963).
02

See

FINANcIAL ACcOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD,

supra note 4, 1 24. The Financial Ac-

counting Standards Board has stated that:
[m]any people base economic decisions on their relationships to and knowledge about business enterprises and thus are potentially interested in the information provided by financial reporting. Among the potential users are owners, lenders, suppliers, potential investors and creditors, employees, management,
directors, customers, financial analysts and advisors... and the public.

Id.; see Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 343-47, 461 A.2d at 147-50; 2 AMERICAN INSTrrUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIc ACcOUNTANTS, AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS ET §§ 51.04, 101.01 (1981);
Wiener, supra note 1, at 251. Accounting professional standards indicate that the objectives
behind financial reporting "stem primarily from the informational needs of external users
who lack the authority to prescribe the financial information they want from an enterprise
and therefore must use the information that management communicates to them." FINANcIAL ACcOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 41, 28.
52 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 349-50 & n.11, 461 A.2d at 151 & n.11; see Contemporary
Approach, supra note 4, at 415 & nn.81, 83; cf. Horan & Guerrini, Accountants' Professional Liability: InsuranceIssues, 15 FORUM 516, 519-20 (1980) (accountants' liability insurance does not limit claims based on "dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, or malicious acts").
But see Gormley, supra note 44, at 572 (insurance policies, when available, are either too
expensive or too limited in coverage to be valid argument for extension of auditor's negligence liability to third parties).
11 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 344, 461 A.2d at 148; see Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins.
Co., 465 F. Supp. 355, 357 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio law permits recovery of purely economic
harm); Randy Knitwear Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 12, 181 N.E.2d 399,
401, 226 N.Y.S.2d 366, 368 (1962) (recovery in products liability for economic harm permitted). But see Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 199, 364 N.E.2d
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the courts from having to apply the artifice of privity in an attempt to distinguish between arguably indistinguishable classes of
plaintiffs that auditors may or may not have known were relying
upon negligently prepared statements. In addition, the general
negligence formula would protect accountants from unlimited liability and frivolous suits by allowing recovery only by those plaintiffs who prove actual reliance on the financial statements."4 Therefore, it is suggested that the appropriate test for determining
accountants' liability for their negligent misstatements should be
the traditional negligence standard.5 5
CONCLUSION

Although the much maligned privity doctrine seems to be fading to obscurity, the doctrine maintains a position of great importance in the area of accountants' liability. As indicated by the
Credit Alliance court, however, there is a general judicial dissatis100, 104 (1977) (economic harm not actionable in Illinois without accompanying physical
harm).
" Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 338-39, 350-51, 461 A.2d at 145, 152; see Citizens State Bank
v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 382, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1983); Wiener, supra
note 1, at 255; see also Strong v. Strong, 102 N.Y. 69, 74-75, 5 N.E. 799, 801 (1886) (if
plaintiff would not have acted but for the representations, action will lie); Agricultural Bond
& Credit Corp. v. August Brandt Co., 204 Wis. 48, 54, 234 N.W. 369, 372 (1931) (well settled
rule that one who acts in reliance upon negligent or fraudulent representation may recover
against its maker); see also 2 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.21, at 252 (1982).
I' Particular caution must be exercised, it is submitted, when applying the general negligence standard, especially in light of the Rosenblum court's analogy to products liability.
Strict liability has emerged as a replacement for the general negligence standard in products
liability. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 965-77; see also Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330,
335, 298 N.E.2d 622, 625, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (1973) (early application of strict liability to
manufacturer's torts). It is submitted that an extension of that doctrine to accountants
would promote the same overbroad and excessive liability that Chief Judge Cardozo tried to
negate in Ultramares, and would afford no more protection to the public than would the
foreseeable reliance standard. An imposition of strict liability would remove any need for a
plaintiff to show that the defendant accountant actually violated the applicable standard of
care. W. PROSSER & W. KEEON, supra note 1, § 107, at 711-12. Prosser notes that the number of cases generally has increased since the advent of strict liability. Id.; see also Note,
Drawing the Line on Strict Liability: A Proposalfor Governing the Recovery of Economic
Damages in Iowa, 67 IOWA L. REv. 995, 1012-34 (1982); Comment, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence: An Economic Analysis of the Law of Libel, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 398-406.
In addition to facilitating meritless suits in which plaintiffs attack every possible "deep
pocket," it is submitted that a strict liability approach would impede the vital flow of financial information from a company to investors, creditors, and customers. Were a strict liability standard to be imposed, it is suggested that accountants, to the extent permitted by
federal and state law, would either charge exorbitant fees or avoid performing audit work
and procedures in instances in which a high degree of uncertainty is involved.
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faction with the strained justifications given for the continued use
of the privity doctrine. Although forced by precedent to limit the
duty of accountants to members of a foreseen class of reliant financial statement users, the Credit Alliance court advocated adoption
of the foreseeable reliance doctrine. While both doctrines are supported by significant policy concerns, the foreseeable plaintiff approach is superior because it encompasses all the well developed
aspects of negligence law and provides reference points upon which
to base the development of credible standards of duty5B Therefore,
it is submitted that the Court of Appeals should recognize the
overwhelming policy and legal support for applying the foreseeable
plaintiff standard and thus deliver the fatal blow upon the illogical
and antediluvian privity doctrine.
James B. Blaney

56 Cf. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650-51, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958) (advocating a
balancing test in professional liability); Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REv. 31, 111-12 (1975) (flexible test similar to
Biakanja).These somewhat different tests are not generally used, but provide another viewpoint on the accountant liability issue. See Fiflis, supra, at 111-12.

